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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Among the principal constraints for SME lending is the 
lack of SME transparency, poor credit information from 
credit registries and bureaus, and weak creditor rights. 
If constraints can be addressed, lending can potentially 
reach bank targets of 21 percent. State banks still play an 
important role in financing SMEs in the MENA region, 
but they use less sophisticated risk management systems 
than private banks. On another hand, credit guarantee 
schemes are a popular form of support to SME finance in 
the region, and are associated with higher levels of SME 
lending. 
   The paper concludes that MENA policy makers should 
This paper is a product of the Financial and Private Sector Development Unit, Middle East and North Africa Region; and 
the Union of Arab Banks. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a 
contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at sfarazi@worldbank.org , dpearce@worldbank.org, 
rania@uabonline.org and rrocha@worldbank.org 
prioritize improvements in financial infrastructure, 
including greater coverage and depth of credit bureaus, 
improvements in the collateral regime (especially for 
movable assets), and increased competition between 
banks and also non-banks. Weaknesses in insolvency 
regimes and credit reporting systems should also be 
alleviated. Direct policy interventions through public 
banks, guarantee schemes, lower reserve requirements 
and subsidized lending and other measures have played 
a role in compensating for MENA’s weak financial 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The financing of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) has attracted great interest from 
academics  and  policy-makers  around  the  world.    SMEs  play  an  essential  role  in  building  a 
competitive private sector and contributing significantly to employment and economic activity.
1 
Despite their importance, SMEs seem significantly more financially constrained than large firms, 
especially in developing countries.  Indeed, enterprise-level surveys conducted by the World 
Bank show that a much smaller share of SMEs has a loan or a line of credit by comparison with 
large firms, and also that access to finance is relatively more constrained in lower and middle 
income countries (Figure 1a).  Other studies using enterprise-level data show that  the lack of 
access to external finance constitutes a major constraint to SME growth.
2  
 
Despite the importance of the topic of SME finance, there has been relatively little research on 
the supply side of bank finance  to SMEs.  Notable exceptions are Beck, Demirguc -Kunt, and 
Peria (2008 and 2009), and De la Torre, Peria, and Schmukler (2010), which provide d the first 
measures of the extent of bank lending to SMEs, as well as the drivers and obstacles to further 
SME lending.  These studies  were based on two surveys, the first covering 45 developing and 
developed countries and  the second 3  Latin American countries  and one Central European 
country.  The results show that most banks increasingly see SMEs as an attractive business, in 
contrast with the traditional view that SME  lending is dominated by small banks and based on 
relationship lending.  However, the studies also show that institutional obstacles to SME lending 
remain and that the SME market is still far from saturated.  
 
The ongoing efforts to investigate further the status of bank lending to SMEs are particularly 
relevant for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  As shown in Figures 1b and 1c, 
enterprise-level surveys conducted by the World Bank suggest that  SMEs are particularly 
financially constrained in MENA countries – only 20 percent of SMEs in MENA have a loan or 
a line of credit, a lower share than any other region, and only 10 percent of their investment 
expenditures are financed by a bank loan, a share that is higher only to the one in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  These results have motivated the design and implementation of a survey of bank lending 
to SMEs in the MENA region that complements the information provided by enterprise surveys 
and provides further insights into the challenge of enhancing SME access to finance. 
 
The objective of this paper is to report the results of a joint survey of the Union of Arab Banks 
and the World Bank (henceforth the MENA survey), including not only the bank responses but 
also the statistical analysis of the dataset.  The MENA survey was conducted between December 
2009 and April 2010 and secured a high response rate across the region.  It draws on material 
from the two previous surveys conducted by the World Bank, thus allowing for comparisons 
with previous results.  However, the MENA survey also contains new material, designed to 
address the specificities of the MENA region and provide more information and granularity to 
                                                           
1 According to Ayyagari et al., (2007) SMEs account for more than 60% of manufacturing employment across 76 
developed and developing economies.  
2 Schiffer and Weder (2001), IADB (2004) and Beck et al. (2005, 2006 and 2008) show SMEs perceive access to 
finance and cost of credit to be greater obstacles than large firms and these factors affect their growth. 2 
 
 
some key issues, including long-run targets for SME lending and the deficiencies in financial 
infrastructure.  Here in this section we report the main stylized facts and results. 
 
First, like the banks surveyed in the two previous surveys, MENA banks also regard the SME 
segment as potentially profitable, and most banks are already engaged in SME lending to some 
degree.  The  drivers  that  motivate  banks  to  engage  in  SME  lending  include  the  potential 
profitability of the SME market, the saturation of the large corporate market, the need to enhance 
returns, and the desire to diversify risks.  Larger banks (measured by total loans) have not played 
a more significant role in SME finance in MENA, but banks with a larger branch network and/or 
that have set up SME units seem to do more SME lending, suggesting that relationship lending 
may still  be important in a region where financial infrastructure remains generally deficient.  
 
Second, despite the interest in the SME sector, lending volumes are still not very impressive.  
The share of SME lending in total lending is only 8 percent, of which 2 percent in the GCC (Gulf 
Cooperation Council) countries, and 13 percent in the non-GCC countries.  The low share of 
SME lending in the GCC reflects largely the characteristics of concentrated oil economies.  The 
share of SME lending in the non-GCC is higher, but still lower than the shares of SME lending 
in developing and developed countries (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Peria (2008), and OECD 
(2010)).  Most importantly, the shares of SME lending in total lending in both the GCC and non-
GCC regions are substantially below the banks‟ own long-run targets, also suggesting substantial 
room for further lending to SMEs. 
 
Third, MENA banks quote the lack of SME transparency and the weak financial infrastructure 
(weak  credit  information,  weak  creditor  rights  and  collateral  infrastructure),  as  the  main 
obstacles  for  further  engagement  in  SME  finance.    Banks  complain  less  about  regulatory 
obstacles  (e.g.  interest  rate  ceilings),  excessive  competition  in  the  SME  market,  or  lack  of 
demand for loans from SMEs.  Within an overall environment of weak financial infrastructure, 
the countries that are able to strengthen creditor rights and provide more information to creditors 
succeed in inducing more SME lending overall or more long-term lending to SMEs.   
 
Fourth, state-owned banks in MENA still play an important role in providing finance to SMEs, 
with an average share of SME lending which is similar to that of private banks.  This reflects 
largely the gaps in SME finance in the region and their mandates in this area.  The generally 
weak quality of financial infrastructure in  MENA is  probably one of the main reasons  why 
private banks have not engaged more in SME finance in several countries, although many private 
banks are making inroads in this area, suggesting that these banks have better SME strategies and 
lending technologies. 
 
Fifth,  state  banks  seem  to  be  taking  greater  risks  than  private  banks  in  their  SME  lending 
business.    They  are  less  selective  in  their  strategies  to  target  SMEs,  have  a  lower  ratio  of 
collateralized loans to SMEs, and a higher share of investment lending in total SME lending.  At 
the  same  time,  they  also  seem  to  have  less  developed  SME  lending  technologies  and  risk 
management systems.  A lower share of state banks has dedicated SME units, makes use of 




Sixth, several MENA countries have introduced special interventions to induce banks to lend 
more to SMEs.  In addition to the use of state banks, special programs have included exemptions 
on  reserve  requirements,  credit  subsidies  and  partial  credit  guarantee  schemes.    Guarantee 
schemes have proved particularly popular and are in operation in ten MENA countries.  The 
paper  provides  some  evidence  that  these  schemes  have  contributed  to  more  SME  lending, 
although it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which these schemes are cost-effective.   
 
While state banks and other interventions such as guarantee schemes  may have a played an 
important role in providing finance to SMEs in an environment where financial infrastructure 
remains weak, the results also allow for the identification of MENA‟s policy agenda in the area 
of SME finance.  Strengthening credit information systems and creditor rights should remain the 
priority item in the legal/regulatory agenda. Credit guarantee schemes may play an important 
role, but it is essential to ensure that these schemes are well-designed and cost-effective.  Finally, 
avoiding  overly  restrictive  entry  requirements  and  allowing  the  entry  of  international  and 
regional  banks  showing  leadership  in  SME  finance  can  improve  competition  and  produce 
positive direct and indirect effects in the market for SME lending.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.   The second section provides an overview of the 
two previous SME banking surveys and their main results.  The third section reviews how the 
MENA survey was designed and implemented.  The fourth section discusses the overall survey 
results.  This includes the actual and target bank lending to SMEs, the main strategic approaches 
adopted  by  MENA  banks  in  dealing  with  SMEs,  the  main  products  offered,  and  the  risk 
management techniques employed.  The fifth section presents a preliminary econometric analysis 
of the dataset built from the survey results and other sources.  Finally, the sixth section concludes 
and identifies the key policy implications.  
 
2.  Overview of Previous Surveys 
 
As mentioned before, two World Bank surveys were conducted in recent years as part of an 
effort to investigate the status of bank lending to SMEs.  These surveys share some important 
common  elements,  but  also  have  important  differences.    Both  surveys  provide  some 
measurement of SME lending, investigate the main drivers and obstacles to further SME lending, 
the main business models developed and the main risk management techniques adopted, but with 
different  emphasis  on  each  of  these  components.    The  two  surveys  are  also  based  on  very 
different samples, regarding their size, the types of bank surveyed, and the regional coverage.    
 
The first survey covered 91 large banks in 45 countries and provided the basis for two separate 
studies – Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2008 and 2009).  The first study provides an 
overall assessment of the survey results while the second provides an econometric analysis of the 
dataset.  This survey included a quantitative component, allowing the authors to obtain measures 
of the share of SME loans in total loans, the share of investment loans in SME loans, percentages 
of applications approved, and loan fees and interest rates.  Besides comparing SME lending in 
developed and developing countries, and investigating drivers and obstacles, the two studies also 




In the first study, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2008) report that the average share 
of SME lending is smaller in developing countries (16 percent of total lending) by comparison 
with the average share in developed countries (22 percent of total lending).  Banks in developing 
and developed countries are primarily attracted by the potential profitability of the SME sector 
and serve SMEs primarily through dedicated SME units.  Government programs are considered 
favorable and prudential regulations are not perceived as burdensome.  Scoring models are used 
by most banks but they are just one of the inputs in loan decision.  Banks in developing countries 
report that macroeconomic instability is the main obstacle to SME lending, rather than flaws in 
the legal and contractual framework.  However, the second study (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Martinez  Peria,  2009),  based  on  the  statistical  analysis  of  the  dataset  concludes  that  the 
differences in SME lending between developing and developed countries are actually explained 
by differences in the quality of the legal and contractual environment (weaker in developing 
countries).  Overall, their analysis suggests that the enabling environment is more important than 
firm size or bank ownership in shaping bank financing to SMEs. 
 
The  study  by  de  la  Torre,  Martinez  Peria  and  Schmukler  (2009)  relies  primarily  on  on-site 
interviews with 37 banks in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Serbia.  The survey did not focus on 
measuring SME lending, but  included  92 questions  covering the  strategic approach to  SME 
lending, business models, and risk management.  The authors complement the information from 
the interviews with a survey by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) across 8 developed 
and developing countries and annual surveys undertaken by FRS (Inmark Group) in 7 countries.   
All in all, data from 48 banks and one leasing company in 12 countries was used in the analysis.   
 
This  study  investigates  to  what  extent  the  conventional  wisdom  on  SME  lending  holds  in 
practice – the conventional view is that large banks are not attracted to SME lending and that the 
SME business is dominated by small banks and based on relationship lending. Their results show 
that the conventional view is not prevalent in practice.  Like the study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Martinez Peria (2008), they find that the SME segment is perceived to be profitable and that 
most banks are interested in serving SMEs, including large and foreign banks.  Almost all the 
banks in the sample have separate SME units and offer a wide range of products and services.  In 
addition to relationship lending, banks apply different transactional technologies such as credit 
scoring,  risk-rating  tools,  and  special  products  such  as  leasing  and  factoring.    There  are 
significant differences across banks and countries regarding the use of particular techniques, but 
these  technologies  allow  banks  to  compensate  for  weaknesses  in  the  enabling  environment. 
Interestingly, the use of government supported programs is reported to be low.   
 
3.  The MENA Survey 
 
Our survey (henceforth the MENA survey) was developed and conducted jointly with the Union 
of Arab Banks (UAB), which is the regional association of all banking associations in the region 
and has a membership of about 330 banks.  The MENA survey has 50 questions distributed into 
four broad sections.  Like the two previous surveys, we included qualitative questions in three 
broad areas: the strategic approach to SME lending, the main products offered to SMEs, and the 
risk management techniques employed.  Moreover, like the survey by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Peria (2008), we also included a fourth and quantitative section designed to measure the extent of 




Many  questions  in  the  MENA  survey  were  directly  drawn  from  the  two  previous  surveys, 
allowing for comparisons of some of the main results.  At the same time, the MENA survey has 
new questions, designed to cover topics that were not covered in the previous surveys, but that 
are important for MENA, or designed to provide granularity on some of the obstacles to SME 
lending.   For example, the MENA survey has included a new question on long-run targets for 
SME lending that allows us to assess the additional room for SME finance by each country.  The 
survey also provides more granularity on some of the problems with financial infrastructure such 
as creditor rights (an area where the MENA region fares very poorly), asks questions on gender 
and  Islamic  finance,  and  finally  includes  some  questions  on  the  status  of  Basel  II 
implementation, because of its potential effects on SME finance. 
 
The first version of the MENA survey was tested in a pilot set of interviews with 6 banks in 2 
countries – Morocco and Egypt.  The results of these interviews provided important insights for 
the final revisions.  The UAB and World Bank teams finalized the revisions and launched the 
survey in December 2009.  The survey was sent in English, French, and Arabic.  The UAB also 
played  a  fundamental  role  in  the  follow-up  phase  (January-May  2010),  through  constant 
communication  with  member  banks,  collecting  responses,  checking  for  inconsistencies,  and 
frequently requesting revisions.  The final response rate was high – slightly less than half of the 
universe, due largely to the active follow-up of UAB staff in headquarters and regional offices.                 
 
Table 1 reports the number of banks and countries from MENA that responded to our survey 
along with their market share. We obtained responses from a total of 139 banks in 16 countries. 
On average the banks that responded account for 64% of the banking system loans. Among the 
16 countries in our sample, 6 are from the GCC and remaining 10 are from outside the GCC. The 
57 GCC banks account for 74% of loans in GCC banking systems, while the 82 non-GCC banks 
account for 58% of non-GCC banking system loans. The sample includes 29 state banks and 110 
private  banks.    Out  of  the  private  banks,  76  are  domestic  banks  and  34  are  foreign  banks.  
However, foreign banks are usually subsidiaries of a parent bank domiciled in a MENA country. 
There are very few subsidiaries of international banks domiciled outside the region.  This implies 
that it is difficult to assess differences in the behavior of foreign and domestic banks, as most 
foreign banks in the sample are part of a MENA regional group that shares the same strategies 
and lending technologies among its subsidiaries.  Therefore, in the paper we explore more the 
differences between GCC and non-GCC banks, as well as the differences between state and 
private banks, rather than the differences between foreign and domestic banks. 
 
The survey does not ask the banks to use a predetermined classification of SMEs, because this 
would have generated technical difficulties and could have resulted in a very low response.  In 
line with other surveys, banks were asked to provide their own definitions for SMEs, in terms of 
employees and turnover.   As shown in Table 2, the average minimum number of employees 
defining a small firm is 3 in the GCC and 4 in the non-GCC countries.  The average maximum 
number of employees defining a small firm in the GCC and non-GCC is 24 and 17 employees 
respectively, while the average maximum number of employees defining a medium firm is 90 for 
the GCC and 58 for the non-GCC countries.  These average thresholds adopted by the banks are 
much smaller than those adopted in the EU.  
  6 
 
 
The same is true for turnover, which is the measure used by most banks to classify their SMEs.  
As shown in Table 2, the average minimum turnover for defining a small enterprise in the non-
GCC is US$61,000, a small number by comparison with the EU‟s threshold of US$2.9 million.  
Likewise, the maximum turnover for defining a medium enterprise in the non-GCC region is 
US$4.7 million, a small number by comparison with the EU‟s US$70 million.  However, it is 
also noticeable that when turnover thresholds are divided by per capita income the differences 
vis-à-vis the EU are much smaller.  This is not surprising, and reveals that MENA banks are 
adapting their definitions of SMEs to the reality of their markets, which generally comprise 
much smaller firms operating with fewer employees.  That being said, it is also true that there are 
still differences in the definitions of SMEs across banks and countries, and therefore, there is 
always some measurement error that must be taken into account when comparing results.  
      
4.  Main Survey Results 
4.1. Overall Extent of SME Lending in MENA 
 
The average share of SME lending in MENA is low – less than 8 percent of total lending – but 
there are significant differences between the two main sub-regions and individual countries, as 
shown in Table 3 and Figures 2a and 3a.  The average share of SME lending in the GCC is only 
2 percent, while the share of SME lending in the non-GCC region is 13 percent.  This is a 
significantly higher figure, although still lower than those reported by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Martinez Peria (2008), for both developing and developed countries, and also lower than the 
average share of five OECD countries (OECD 2010), as shown in Table 4.   
 
It  is  noticeable  that  the  average  share  of  SME  lending  is  consistently  low  across  all  GCC 
countries, while there is more variation among non-GCC countries.  The low share of SME 
lending  in  the  GCC  reflects  to  a  large  extent  the  structure  of  oil-based  economies  –  less 
diversified, dominated by very large enterprises, and characterized by appreciated exchange rates 
and small non-oil traded sectors.  These factors imply a more narrow space for SMEs to flourish, 
especially in non-oil sectors producing traded goods.  Moreover, GCC countries tend to have 
small populations, and the nationals tend to find attractive positions in the public sector, which 
may also discourage risk-taking in the SME sector.  By contrast, in the non-GCC countries there 
is probably scope for more SME growth across a wider range of economic sectors, including 
traded sectors, and also as part of supply chains linked to large enterprises. 
 
In the case of non-GCC countries, three sub-groups can be identified: a first group with SME 
lending below 10% of total lending (Syria, Egypt), an intermediate group with SME lending 
between  10%-15%  of  total  lending  (Palestine,  Jordan),  and  a  third  group  with  SME  loans 
between 15%-24% of total loans (Tunisia, Lebanon, Yemen, and Morocco). There could be an 
element of error in country comparisons, related to different definitions of SMEs adopted by the 
banks.   However, Figure 3b indicates that there is  broad consistency  between the results  of 
enterprise surveys and the results of this survey (the comparison is only made where both survey 
results are available).  The countries with the highest shares of enterprises with a loan tend to be 
the  countries  with  the  highest  share  of  SME  loans  in  total  loans  –  Morocco,  Lebanon,  and 
Yemen, while the countries with the lowest shares of enterprises with a loan tend to also have 
small shares of SME loans – Syria, Egypt, and the Palestine (the correlation between the two 
variables  is  0.54,  and  the  ranking  correlation  is  0.68).    Therefore,  despite  the  different 7 
 
 
methodologies, there is broad consistency between the results of the enterprise surveys and the 
MENA survey.
3      
 
There seems to be significant scope  for further SME lending in MENA, as shown by the large 
differences between the long-run targets and the actual shares of SME lending reported by the 
banks (Table 3 and Figure 2a).  This is true in both the GCC and the non-GCC regions, although 
targets are significantly lower in the GCC (about 12% of total lending), revealing that the banks 
themselves have concluded that there are “natural” limits to profitable SME lending in oil-based 
economies.  In the case of non-GCC countries, the long-run target is much higher and around 
27% of total lending.  It is interesting to note that this target is very similar to  the actual share of 
SME  lending  in  developed  economies.  This  could  be  more  than  a  coincidence,  and  reflect 
expectations by the banks that the enabling environment and market conditions in MENA will 
eventually converge to those already prevailing in developed countries, creating the conditions 
for further and profitable SME lending.      
 
State banks play an important role in SME lending in several MENA countries, as indicated by 
an average share of SME loans of 9% of total lending. This share is very close to the average 
share of private banks (Table 5 and Figure 2b).    The long-run targets for SME lending for State 
and private banks are also similar.  Moreover, while the differences between the average shares 
of  SME  loans  in  GCC  and  non-GCC  countries  are  large  and  statistically  significant,  the 
differences between state and private banks are not statistically significant, as shown in Table 5.  
The important role played by  state banks  could  reflect  their mandates to  fill  a gap in SME 
lending, especially where the enabling environment remains weak and the private banks are still 
reluctant to take more risk, despite the potential profitability of the SME business.  This result 
will be further explored below. 
 
In addition to having a larger SME portfolio overall, non-GCC banks also extend a larger share 
of investment loans than GCC banks.  As shown in Table 5, the differences are statistically 
significant, whether the averages are weighted or unweighted.  It is also noticeable that State 
banks  have  a  larger  share  of  investment  loans  in  their  SME  loan  portfolios,  although  the 
difference between the two averages  is  not  statistically significant  (this result is  revisited in 
section 5).  Finally, there are no significant differences between foreign and private domestic 
banks in our sample.  As mentioned before, this is not surprising, as most banks classified as 
foreign banks in our sample are in fact part of a regional group that shares the same strategy and 
lending technologies across the mother bank and the subsidiaries and branches.    
 
The analysis of frequency distributions at the individual bank level sheds further light on the 
patterns  of  SME  lending  in  MENA.    As  shown  in  Figures  4a-4b,  all  the  distributions  are 
positively and strongly skewed, with a high concentration of institutions with small shares.  In 
the case of the GCC, some banks maintain shares of SME loans above 5% of total loans, but the 
maximum share is 10%, still a low number by international comparison.  In the non-GCC, a 
large number of banks also operate with low shares, although there is also a sizable group of 
                                                           
3 Since the first draft of this paper was released, the authors have made further efforts to confirm and validate the 
numbers.  This has resulted in some adjustments of country averages, especially for Morocco, whose average of 
SME lending in total lending declined from 33 percent to 24 percent. 8 
 
 
banks that seem very engaged in SME lending, with shares of SME loans around one third of 
total loans.  A similar pattern is observed in the case of private banks.  Most institutions operate 
with low shares, but there is a sizable group that seems more engaged in the SME business.  By 
contrast, the distribution of SME lending among state banks is more uneven. 
 
The clustering of banks operating with low shares of SME lending could reflect a set of common 
obstacles such as  weak  financial infrastructure.   The banks  in  the intermediate range of the 
distribution could be operating in countries with better enabling environments, or could be doing 
relationship lending with a large branch network, or could still be leading banks with more 
advanced SME lending technologies.  These questions will be pursued further in section 5.             
 
4.2. Strategic Approach to SME Banking 
 
In line with other surveys, most banks in MENA are already engaged in the SME sector, despite 
the low share of lending in many of these banks.  As shown in Figure 5a, about 87 percent of 
banks in the GCC already have SMEs as clients, and the same percentage already has a separate 
unit to manage the SME business.  The percentage of non-GCC banks that already has SMEs as 
clients is even higher at 96 percent, as shown in Figure 5a.  This is expected, given the relatively 
higher  importance  of  SMEs  in  non-GCC  economies,  and  the  higher  average  share  of  SME 
lending among non-GCC banks.  What seems surprising is the lower share of non-GCC banks 
with a dedicated SME unit.   
 
The  lower  share  of  non-GCC  banks  with  dedicated  SME  units  reflects  to  some  extent  the 
relatively  low  share  of  state  banks  with  these  units  (most  state  banks  are  in  the  non-GCC 
countries).  As shown in Figure 5b, although state banks are also very engaged in the SME 
business, only 56 percent have already set up a separate SME unit, while in the case of private 
banks this figure is significantly higher at 74 percent.  All in all, these figures indicate that many 
private banks are committed to SME lending and willing to allocate internal resources to develop 
the SME business and reach their long-run targets for SME lending.  Even in the GCC, where 
SME lending plays a comparatively less important role, most banks have already a dedicated 
SME unit presumably created to reach the proposed targets.    
 
There are a number of common factors driving banks to engage with SMEs across regions and 
ownership structures. In line with the previous surveys, the most important factor mentioned by 
both GCC and non-GCC banks is the perceived profitability of the SME segment (Figure 6a).
4 
Other important and inter-related factors include the saturation of the market for large corporates 
and the need to diversify the loan portfolio.  The prospects of generating business through cross-
selling are rated as important or very important by  a large share of GCC and non -GCC banks 
alike.  Interestingly, government programs are rated as relatively less important, especially in the 
GCC. Government programs are  generally more important among non-GCC banks, although a 
closer look at the questionnaire reveals significant differences across non-GCC countries.  
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A  large  share  of  state  banks  is  also  attracted  to  the  SME  business  due  to  the  perceived 
profitability of the sector (Figure 6b), but the share is somewhat lower than the one for private 
banks.  Interestingly, supply chain links and cross selling do not seem to be important drivers for 
state banks.  These responses could reflect the broad policy mandates imposed on state banks to 
serve the SME sector, or the lower level of development of SME strategies in these banks, 
possibly also related to the absence of an SME unit in several of these banks.   
 
Regarding the obstacles to SME lending, the responses in the MENA survey were more clear and 
consistent than those in the two previous surveys conducted in Latin America and worldwide.  
As shown in Figures 7a and 7b, MENA banks complain primarily about SME opacity and about 
the weak financial infrastructure (lack of reliable collateral, weak credit information systems, and 
weak creditor rights).  They complain much less about restrictive regulations (e.g. interest rate 
controls), excessive competition in the SME segment, or weak demand for loans from SMEs.  
This pattern is consistently observed in both GCC and non-GCC banks, and also between state 
and private banks.  Interestingly, however, a larger share of state banks indicated that their own 
internal technical weaknesses constitute an obstacle to SME lending.   
 
The contrast with the two previous surveys is striking.  In the Latin American survey (de la 
Torre,  Martinez  Peria,  and  Schmukler  (2010)),  banks  indicated  many  types  of  obstacles, 
including macroeconomic factors, regulations, and excessive competition in the SME business, 
and the patterns were not consistent across countries.  For example, the legal and contractual 
environment  was  identified  as  an  important  obstacle  in  only  two  countries.  In  the  survey 
conducted  by  Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Martinez  Peria  (2008),  macroeconomic  factors  and 
competition in the SME segment were also identified as the major obstacles, not the legal and 
contractual environment.  The greater concern expressed by MENA banks about the quality of 
financial infrastructure is not surprising, considering that the region fares very poorly in this area.  
As  shown  in  Table  6,  the  region  has  the  lowest  legal  rights  index  among  all  the  regions.  
Moreover, while the credit information index has improved in recent years, but the coverage of 
credit reporting systems is still very limited.
5   
 
In order to obtain more detailed information on the weaknesses of collateral regimes in MENA – 
an area where the region fares very poorly – the survey included questions on the problems faced 
by banks on the different elements of the secured lending chain – especially the registration, 
enforcement, and final sale of the seized collateral.  Moreover, the questions were broken down 
by fixed and movable collateral.  The answers are reported in Figures 8a-8b and 8c-8d, for GCC 
and non-GCC countries and for state and private banks. 
 
As shown in Figures 8a-8d, there are significant problems in the registration, enforcement, and 
selling of collateral, especially movable collateral.  While a relative low share of banks reports 
serious problems  with  the registration of fixed collateral,  a  high  share  of banks  reports  that 
registries  of  movables  remain  very  deficient.    Enforcement  of  collateral  is  an  even  bigger 
problem, especially for movables, but also for fixed collateral in the case of non-GCC banks.  
Finally, an even larger share of banks reports problems in selling the seized collateral.  Again, 
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this is true for both GCC and non-GCC banks, and applies both to fixed and movable collateral.  
The same pattern of responses applies to state and private banks, although it is also noticeable 
that a larger share of state banks complains about the collateral regime than private banks.  These 
responses reveal that creditors perceive high risks in SME lending that can only be partially 
offset  through  greater  reliance  on  relationship  lending,  or  through  the  use  of  other  lending 
techniques such as leasing and factoring, or even through access to a guarantee scheme. 
 
4.3. SME Products 
 
As shown in Figure 9a, almost all the banks that responded to the survey offer loans to SMEs, 
with deposit and cash management accounts, trade finance, and payments and transfers following 
closely behind as the most widely offered SME finance products. More than 85 percent of banks 
in both regions reported offering each of these services, which confirms that SME finance is 
much broader than SME lending, despite the tendency in  literature to  often equate the two.  
Actual SME uptake of these services is likely to be higher for current accounts and payments – 
which are used for daily transactions - than for loans and trade finance.   
 
Only 76 percent of state banks offered payments and transfers, or trade finance, which was 
markedly lower than for private banks at 88 percent and 94 percent respectively, and may reflect 
a relative emphasis on more conventional SME lending (Figure 9b). At the other end of the 
spectrum, services that are least widely offered are insurance (19 percent of GCC banks, 34 
percent of non-GCC banks), and leasing (31 percent in GCC, 27 percent in non-GCC), and these 
are typically offered through wholly-owned subsidiaries.  A larger share of private banks offers 
insurance and leasing products than state banks, but the differences are not very large.  
 
It is perhaps surprising that neither leasing (a form of asset financing) or factoring (a form of 
supply chain financing) are  more developed among MENA banks, as these technologies seem to 
offer a solution to weaknesses in legal and contractual regimes.
6  However, while leasing and 
factoring are in principle well suited to countries with weak collateral regimes, in practice weak 
protection of ownership rights and contract enforcement dilute or even eliminate their supposed 
advantages.  The low presence of banks in leasing can be explained in many MENA countries by 
the lack of clarity in the legal framework for leasing , including leasing definition, balance in 
responsibilities  between  lessor  and  lessee,  regulations  for  different  forms  of  leasing ,  a 
cumbersome  process  for  registering  leased  assets,  weak  asset  repossession  process es,  and 
unfavorable  tax  treatment.
7  Follow-up  interviews  with  some  MENA  banks  also  revealed 
difficulties in disposing of the repossessed assets in thin secondary markets.  
 
An analysis of distribution channels used  by banks to service SMEs points to the importance of 
branches offering services tailored to SME needs, which may reflect the continuing importance 
of  „relationship  banking‟  (Figures  10a-10b).  „Limited  service  branches‟  including  dedicated 
SME business  center branches  are widely used distribution channels.  Private banks  are the 
largest users of limited service branches (94 percent), and place less reliance on full service 
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branches  (39  percent  for  private  banks,  56  percent  for  state  banks).  This  suggests  a  greater 
emphasis by private banks on cost efficiency, and perhaps also that state banks may benefit from 
a legacy of more extensive branch networks.  ATMs are important, but mobile branches are not 
widely used for SME financing, although points of sale (POS) are widely used by GCC banks 
(58  percent)  for  services  such  as  payments,  transfers,  and  potentially  also  withdrawals  and 
deposits.  The low use of mobile branches and agents may reflect a lack of emphasis on serving 
rural SMEs, or restrictive regulations on the use of agents to offer banking services, although it 
may also suggest that a minimum level of bank staff is required to adequately meet SME needs.   
  
GCC banks are much more active in Islamic Finance than non-GCC banks, with 59 percent of 
GCC  banks  offering  Shariah-compliant  products,  as  versus  30  percent  of  non-GCC  banks 
(Figure 11a).  A further 32 percent of GCC banks plan to offer Islamic products in the next 12 
months, and 26 percent of non-GCC banks. This implies that up to 91 percent of GCC banks are 
or will be engaged in Islamic finance, and over half (56 percent) of non-GCC banks. State banks 
seem more engaged in Islamic finance than private banks, although by a narrow margin.  All 
banks offering Shariah-compliant products offer Murabaha (cost plus) financing, which is more 
typically used for working capital.  Ijara, which is similar to leasing, is the next most prevalent 
for GCC, private and state banks.  Islamic finance seems to be an area of increasing involvement 
for both GCC and non-GCC banks.  
 
A very low share of banks run programs targeted at female-owned businesses.  As shown in 
Figure 12a, only 13 percent of GCC banks maintained this type of program, and the figure in the 
non-GCC was not much higher (22 percent).  Interestingly, state banks seem more proactive than 
private banks in this area, as shown in Figure 12b.   It is also noticeable that only 22 percent of 
loan officers of GCC banks are women (35 percent for non-GCC banks).  This is despite the 
additional access to finance constraints that women can face, and the fact that in some MENA 
countries only female loan officers can deal with female clients, particularly for site visits.   
 
Finally, a very low share of banks reported that female loan officers are better at managing risk 
and ensuring client repayment – only 10 percent of GCC banks and 19 percent of non-GCC 
banks reported that the percentage of defaulted loans was lower for female loan officers.  The 
great  majority  of  respondents  indicated  that  there  were  no  significant  differences  in  loan 
performance, while a few reported that male officers performed better.  This seems in contrast 
with research showing that the default probability for female loan officers can be as much as 4.5 
percent lower than for their male counterparts.
8 
 
4.4. Risk Management 
 
A large share of GCC banks perceives SMEs as riskier than large corporates and housing loans, 
as shown in Figure 13a.  This result is consistent with the low share of SME loans in the loan 
portfolio of GCC banks, and with the large share of GCC banks that have set up SME units to 
develop the SME business while managing the perceived high risks.  SMEs are also perceived to 
be risky by non-GCC banks, but not nearly to the same degree.   Intriguingly, a larger share of 
state banks perceive SMEs as riskier than large corporates, relative to private banks (Figure 13b), 
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but  this  perception  does  not  prevent  them  from  engaging  in  the  SME  business,  possibly 
reflecting their mandates to fill the SME financing gap, regardless of the associated risks.  
 
GCC banks seem to adopt stricter selection criteria for engaging in SME lending, relative to non-
GCC banks.  As shown in Figure 14a, in selecting potential SMEs, a larger share of GCC banks 
considers specific factors such as the growth prospects of specific SME sectors, the size of their 
exposure to these sectors, and the existing clientele.  The apparently stricter selection criteria 
adopted by GCC banks is consistent with the higher perception of risk in the SME business 
among these banks, and with the smaller volumes of SME lending as well.  Interestingly, GCC 
banks do not target exporting SMEs, a result which can be explained by the limited number of 
exporting SMEs in oil economies (Figure 15c).    
 
At the same time, the apparently lesser relevance of selection criteria among non-GCC banks 
disguises large differences between state and private banks.  As shown in Figure 14b, a much 
lower share of state banks adopts selection criteria to identify and screen their clients and build 
up their SME portfolios than private banks.   This again probably reflects the broad mandates of 
state banks to fill the SME financing gap and serve the SME sector.    
 
Less than half of GCC and non-GCC banks have developed internal scoring models to assess the 
risk of current and prospective clients (Figure 15a).  An even smaller share makes use of external 
scoring.  Since most public registries and private credit bureaus still do not provide  scoring 
models, the respondent banks are referring to models developed by external consulting firms, 
frequently  non-customized  models.    Almost  all  the  banks  are  making  an  effort  to  develop 
internal rating systems, combining credit scores of the owner with other information from the 
SME, both  qualitative and quantitative.   It  is  noticeable that very  few  banks  use automated 
application processing.  This result reflects to some extent the weak state of development of 
credit reporting systems in MENA, and the limited reliance on the quality of internal credit 
scores.  However, the other two surveys also reported that internal scoring is only one element in 
the lending decision, suggesting that many banks in other developing countries are struggling 
with similar challenges.    
 
At the same time, the average results reported by non-GCC banks disguise significant differences 
between state and private banks.  As shown in Figure 15b, a significantly lower share of state 
banks has developed internal credit scores or internal ratings systems, and a very low share has 
adopted automated application processing, again revealing that these banks have not developed 
their SME lending technologies and risk management systems as much as the private banks. 
 
A very low share of GCC banks informs their SME clients about the factors driving their internal 
score or ratings, as shown in Figure 16a.  The same is true for state banks, as shown in Figure 
16b.  In the case of state banks, this result is probably associated with the low development and 
use  of  credit  scores.    In  any  case,  these  are  not  welcome  findings,  as  they  reveal  missed 
opportunities  to  increase  awareness  among  SMEs  of  their  weaknesses  and  encourage 
improvements in performance.
9  A much larger share of non -GCC and private banks informs 
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their SME clients about the factors driving their scores/ratings, but there is clearly scope for 
further improvements here as well.   
 
MENA banks conduct stress tests to assess their exposures to large losses, but by very different 
degrees.  As shown in Figure 17a, GCC banks seem particularly concerned with the slowdown of 
particular  sectors,  especially  hydrocarbons  and  real  estate  and  much  less  concerned  with 
currency  shocks.    This  is  not  surprising  considering  that  these  banks  operate  in  highly 
concentrated oil economies with abundant foreign reserves.  By contrast, non-GCC banks are 
more  concerned  with  currency  and  commodity  price  shocks,  reflecting  their  higher 
vulnerabilities  in  these  areas.    However,  the  most  striking  finding  is  the  large  differences 
between state and private banks (17b).  In general, a much lower share of state banks conducts 
regular stress tests than private banks, despite their mandates and the associate risks that they 
take, including the risks in the SME lending business. 
 
A large share of GCC banks imposes higher collateral requirements on SMEs, relative to large 
corporates, as shown in Figure 18a.  This again reflects the higher perception of risk in the SME 
business among GCC banks.  When asked about the reasons for the higher collateral, a large 
share of GCC banks indicated that the lack of stability, competent management, and difficulties 
to evaluate SMEs were very important reasons (see the upper part of the bars in Figure 18b).  By 
contrast, less than half of non-GCC banks impose higher collateral on SMEs.  The reasons for 
the higher collateral are the same but the relative importance is generally lower. 
 
Again,  the  average  responses  reported  by  non-GCC  banks  disguise  important  differences 
between state and private banks.  As shown in Figure 18c, it is noteworthy that only 45 percent 
of state banks impose higher collateral requirements on SMEs, a small share by comparison with 
that of private banks – 64 percent.  This difference holds despite the fact that a large share of 
state banks complains about the lack of SME stability and the difficulty to evaluate SMEs.  This 
result again reveals that state banks are willing to take higher risks and be exposed to larger 
losses, relative to private banks, in order to fulfill their mandates.   
 
Assessing the status of compliance with Basel 2 provides some information on a bank‟s capacity 
to manage risks in general, including the risks of the SME portfolio.  It is also relevant for 
assessing the possible impact on SME lending, as banks can benefit from lower capital charges 
under certain conditions.  As shown in Figure 19a, a large share of GCC banks has already made 
progress in adopting Basel 2.  Most banks are adopting the standardized approach, which in 
principle should enable them to classify SMEs in the retail portfolio and get a lower capital 
charge.  By contrast, one third of non-GCC banks have not yet adopted Basel 2, suggesting that 
they are generally behind in their capacity to manage risks.  
 
The breakdown of the responses between state and private banks provides additional insights.  
As shown in Figure 20b, almost half of state banks have not yet adopted Basel 2, a much higher 
share than that reported by private banks.  This suggests again that state banks in MENA have 
generally lagged behind in the development of their governance and risk management systems, 




A large share of MENA banks indicates that the impact of the adoption of Basel II on SME 
lending will be either neutral or positive.   As shown in  Figures 20a-20b, this response was 
consistent across banks.  These responses are also consistent with a study commissioned by the 
European Commission with the objective to assess the consequences of Basel II on the European 
economy with particular attention to SMEs – it concluded that the overall impact of Basel II 
would be positive for Europe‟s SMEs, despite possible variations across sectors, segments of 
SMEs, regions, and other dimensions.
10 
 
5.  A Preliminary Analysis of the Dataset 
 
This section provides an econometric analysis of the dataset to explore further the factors that 
contribute to SME lending in MENA.  More specifically, we want to test further the differences 
between regions and ownership structures while controlling for other factors.  We also want to 
examine whether large banks play an important role in SME finance (Berger and Udell, 2006; de 
la Torre et al., 2008 and Beck et al., 2009), and whether banks are engaged in relationship 
lending (Berger et al., 1995, 2001; Berger and Udell, 1996; Sengupta, 2007). Finally, we want to 
assess  the  impact  of  financial  infrastructure  and  special  interventions  such  as  partial  credit 
guarantee schemes on overall SME lending and the share of SME investment loans. 
 
To examine these different hypotheses, we estimated the following regression model:  
 
Yit =α0+ α1Loansit + α2GCCit + α3Stateit + α4Relationit + α5Coverit + α6Legalit + α7Guarit + eit 
 
where i refers to the bank and t refers to time.  The dependent variable Y stands for either SME 
loans as a percentage of total loans or investment loans as a percentage of SME loans. Loans 
refer to total volume of loans for a bank and controls for the size of the bank. GCC is a dummy 
that takes the value 1 if the bank operates in the GCC region and 0 otherwise. State is a dummy 
that equals 1 if the bank is state-owned and 0 otherwise.   
 
Relation is a variable that controls either for number of branches for a bank or it depicts a 
dummy  variable  which  takes  a  value  1  if  bank  has  a  separate  unit  for  SME  clients  and  0 
otherwise. We decided to use these two variables alternatively as proxies for relationship lending 
because the interviews with the banks revealed that in many cases the SME unit served simply as 
a focal point for relationship lending, including those units in small banks with few branches.   
 
The role of SME units is an important issue that merits further clarification.  Banks set up SME 
units to develop more articulated strategies of SME finance, but it is not clear that the presence 
of  an  SME  unit  by  itself  means  that  the  bank  has  moved  from  relationship  lending  to 
transactional lending.  Our survey indicates that about 90% of banks that have a separate SME 
unit also have some rating system, but these rating models seem to vary greatly in their use of 
hard  statistical  data,  and  the  development  of  statistical  models  is  generally  limited  by  the 
weaknesses in credit information. Moreover, it is noteworthy that very few banks have adopted 
automated application processing, maybe the best evidence that transactional lending is not well 
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developed  in  MENA  yet.  Therefore,  while  many  SME  units  seem  to  be  developing  more 
sophisticated lending techniques, in most cases they are still conducting relationship lending, 
although in a more effective way. 
 
We also look at how the quality of financial infrastructure in a country affects SME lending. 
Cover is a variable that represents the volume of credit information provided to lenders by public 
credit registries or private credit bureaus. This variable is based on information from the World 
Bank‟s Doing Business Database and is defined by the highest coverage ratio of either the public 
registry  or  the  private  bureau.
11  The  Legal  variable  measures  the  quality  of  the  legal  and 
contractual framework, and is represented by several alternative legal indicators from the World 
Bank‟s Doing Business database. We use: (i) the legal rights index that measures the degree to 
which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of lenders, (ii) the time to register a 
property, (iii) the time to enforce a contract and (iv) the time to close a business.  All these 
indicators capture the strength of creditor rights and the risks of SME lending. 
 
Finally, we look at the impact of a particular type of government intervention – partial credit 
guarantee  schemes  (PCGs).    These  schemes  have  become  a  popular  tool  to  stimulate  SME 
lending in many countries, and 10 MENA countries have already introduced such schemes.
12  
Guar is a variable that measures the size of PCGs through the ratio of outstanding guarantees to 
GDP. Table 7 provides information on the stock of outstanding guarantees (in % of GDP) of 
MENA PCGs.  Some schemes are still very young and have not yet accumulated a significant 
volume of guarantees.  
Our analysis includes all the countries listed in Table 1 except for Libya (where we could not 
verify the data).  Most banks reported information for at least two years in the 2007-2009 period, 
allowing us to build a panel of about 240 observations. The appendix tables provide descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the regression, the correlation matrix and the definitions and 
sources of the variables.  
For estimation we first use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), where we relax the assumptions of 
independence and homoskedasticy and report two sets of standard errors: Huber/White robust 
standard errors  and robust  standard errors  corrected for possible intra-bank correlation.   We 
realize  the  potential  endogeneity  of  the  partial  credit  guarantee  variable  –  the  volume  of 
outstanding guarantees reflects at least partly the demand for guarantees from banks lending to 
SMEs.  Therefore,  we  also  use  Two  State  Least  Squares  (2SLS)  and  employ  the  lag  of 
outstanding guarantees and the median statutory coverage ratios of the guarantee schemes as 
instrumental variables (IVs).  The coverage ratio is the share of the loan which is guaranteed and 
is one of the key statutory rules of a guarantee scheme.  Coverage ratios remained constant 
during the estimation period and it can be argued that they only affected SME lending through 
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the operations of the guarantee scheme. These IVs seem reasonable and also satisfy the formal 
tests of instrument validity and relevance in most of the regressions.
13   
OLS results are reported in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, while 2SLS results are reported in Tables 8.3 and 
8.4. In Tables 8.1 and 8.3, the share of SME loans in total loans is the dependent variable, while 
Tables 8.2 and 8.4  report the results  for the share of investment loans in SME loans as  the 
dependent variable.  In all the tables we report separately the results for the number of branches 
or the presence of a dedicated SME unit as the measure of relationship lending.  We also report 
separately the results for each of the four legal indicators. 
Total loans have a negative and mostly significant coefficient for both OLS and 2SLS results 
(Tables 8.1 and 8.3). This shows that large banks are less engaged in SME lending, controlling 
for other factors. Tables 8.2 and 8.4 show that large banks are also less involved in long-term 
SME  lending,  although  these  results  are  not  so  robust  as  those  in  the  previous  regressions.  
Overall, these results are probably capturing the presence of large wholesale banks in the MENA 
region that are primarily engaged in project finance and do not target SMEs. 
 
The GCC dummy coefficient is negative and significant in Tables 8.1 and 8.3, suggesting that 
the share of SME loans remains significantly lower among GCC banks after controlling for other 
factors, a result consistent with our earlier analysis.  The same pattern holds for investment 
lending to SMEs.  As shown in Tables 8.2 and 8.4, GCC banks are also less engaged in long-
term SME lending relative to non-GCC banks. 
 
The state dummy coefficient in Tables 8.1 and 8.3 is not statistically significant, indicating that 
there  are  no  significant  differences  between  state  and  private  banks  regarding  overall  SME 
lending.  This result confirms our previous analysis that state banks remain important players in 
SME finance in the MENA region.  Moreover, the results in Table 8.2 and 8.4 suggest that state 
banks do more investment lending than private banks – the coefficient of the state dummy is 
positive and mostly significant, even when the errors are clustered.  We note that although the 
difference  between  the  simple  averages  of  the  share  of  investment  loans  is  not  statistically 
significant  (Table  5),  it  becomes  significant  when  controlling  for  other  factors.  The  result 
confirms  that  state  banks  are  taking  more  risk  in  SME  lending  and  compensating  for  the 
weaknesses in financial infrastructure, as discussed in the previous section. 
 
Banks in the MENA region still seem to rely on relationship lending, possibly to compensate for 
the weak financial infrastructure.  As shown in Tables 8.1 through 8.4, the coefficient of the 
branch variable is positive and significant in many regressions, especially where the share of 
investment loans in SME loans is the dependent variable.  Interestingly, the reverse seems to 
happen with SME unit dummy.  It is positive and significant in most regressions where the share 
of SME loans is the dependent variable, but not significant when the share of investment loans is 
the  dependent  variable.  These  results  are  not  always  uniform,  but  suggest  that  banks  use 
relationship lending to overcome information asymmetries and the opaqueness of SMEs.  As 
mentioned before, the survey does not allow us to identify the extent to which these SME units 
are relying on statistical models in their lending decisions.  There is a movement in the direction 
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of transactional lending, but we note again that power of these techniques is still limited by the 
poor quality of credit information in most MENA countries.  
 
The coefficient of the variable measuring coverage of credit information is positive but generally 
not significant when the share of SME loans is the dependent variable (Tables 8.1 and 8.3).  It 
performs slightly better when the share of investment loans is the dependent variable (Tables 8.2 
and 8.4), but the results for this variable are rather disappointing, as MENA banks report the lack 
of good credit information as one of the major obstacles to further SME lending.  It is possible 
that  statistical  testing  within  a  MENA-only  sample  is  hindered  by  the  limited  variability  of 
coverage ratios in the region.  As mentioned before, the region does not fare well in this area and 
most MENA countries report very low coverage ratios, especially the Non-GCC countries.  
 
The four variables measuring the quality of the legal framework have the expected signs and are 
generally significant in Tables 8.1 and 8.3. Although MENA does not compare well with other 
regions in this area either, these results show that the countries that have made an effort to 
strengthen creditor rights have succeeded in increasing the share of SME lending.  Interestingly, 
the legal variables are not significant when the share of SME investment loans is the dependent 
variable (Tables 8.2 and 8.4).  This suggests that the legal framework affects the overall volume 
of SME lending but not its composition.  In other words, a strong legal framework promotes 
SME lending overall by facilitating the recovery of the loan and/or the collateral, but may not 
have such a strong impact on the decision to extend the maturity of the loan.   
 
Finally, the variable measuring the size of guarantee schemes is positive and significant in most 
OLS  regressions  reported  in  Tables  8.1  and  8.2.    This  implies  that  these  schemes  have 
contributed both to more SME lending and to a higher share of investment lending. Indeed, the 
countries which seem to have a larger share of SME lending in MENA – Morocco, Lebanon and 
Tunisia – also have larger guarantee schemes, as shown in Figure 3a and Table 7.   Moreover, 
Tables  8.3  and  8.4  show  that  the  credit  guarantee  variable  remains  generally  positive  and 
significant after correcting for endogeneity bias, especially when the total share of SME loans is 
the dependent variable.     
     
These results suggest that guarantee schemes have contributed to SME lending in a period when 
MENA countries are still addressing their weaknesses in financial infrastructure.  At the same 
time, it is also important to stress that these results do not necessarily imply that these guarantee 
schemes are cost-effective, additional, or promote good practice SME lending. For example, 
whether they are able to target and reach the maximum possible number of credit constrained 
SMEs with the volume of guarantees offered (cost-effectiveness), or whether banks use the PCG 
to extend loans to start-up or smaller SMEs (additionality).  In this regard, Saadani, Arvai and 
Rocha (2010) provide a preliminary assessment of PCGs in MENA and argue that there is scope 
for design improvements leading to gains in outreach and additionality. 
 
All in all, these results are consistent with the survey responses reported in the previous section.  
They are admittedly subject to a number of limitations, including possible measurement errors in 
the dependent variable (due to different definitions of SMEs adopted by the banks), the narrow 
variance  of  some  of  the  right  hand  side  variables,  and  also  the  limitations  of  some  of  the 
indicators used.  The regressions explain only about one third of the variations in SME lending 18 
 
 
across banks, indicating the existence of other important bank and country-level effects.  For 
example, some individual banks have better strategies and lending technologies, and there are 
country-level  effects  and  programs  that  are  not  easily  measurable  (e.g.  interest  subsidies, 
exemptions on reserve requirements). Even acknowledging these caveats, however, we believe 
that the results are insightful and help in initiating more research in this important area. 
 
6.  Summary of Findings and Policy Implications 
 
This paper reports the results of a survey of SME lending with unusually high coverage of banks 
in  the  MENA  region.  The  paper  shows  that  the  average  SME  loan  portfolio  in  MENA  is 
relatively small amounting to less than 8 percent of total loans.  The survey also shows the wide 
differences in the scale of SME lending between GCC and non-GCC countries (much smaller in 
the  former  group),  as  well  as  the  scope  for  further  SME  lending  in  both  sets  of  countries, 
revealed by the large difference between the long-run targets and the actual lending levels.   
  
State banks play an important role in SME lending in many MENA countries, to a large extent a 
compensatory role for the low private bank involvement in SME finance in these countries.  
Moreover,  state  banks  seem  to  take  more  risk  than  private  banks,  as  indicated  by  broader 
selection criteria, more exposure to term lending, and softer collateral requirements.  However, 
they do not seem to have developed sufficient risk management capacity to manage these risks – 
a smaller share of state banks has introduced dedicated SME units, adopted internal scoring 
models, and conducted regular stress tests to monitor the risks related to SME lending.  
 
Several MENA countries have introduced credit guarantee schemes, and there is some evidence 
that these schemes may have contributed to more SME lending.  The countries with the largest 
shares of SME loans in the total loan portfolio are the ones with the largest schemes, and the 
statistical analysis of the dataset also suggests that credit guarantee schemes may have induced 
more SME lending, controlling for other factors.  However, these results do not necessarily mean 
that MENA credit guarantee schemes are cost-effective, in the sense of reaching the maximum 
number of viable and credit-constrained SMEs within their overall guarantee envelope.   
 
These and other policy  interventions  are  in  many countries  compensating for weaknesses in 
financial infrastructure, including weaknesses in collateral and insolvency regimes, as well as 
deficiencies in credit information systems.  These interventions may be well justified, but they 
should not be the main components of the architecture of SME finance in the MENA region.  
 
Improving financial infrastructure should be the priority item in the policy agenda of MENA 
countries.  MENA banks report that deficiencies in financial infrastructure are one of the major 
obstacles for further SME lending, and the statistical analysis of the dataset largely confirms this 
survey result.  Improving financial infrastructure will entail expanding the range of movable 
assets  that  can  be  used  as  collateral,  improving  registries  for  movables,  and  improving 
enforcement and sales procedures for both fixed and movable assets.  It also entails upgrading 
public  credit  registries,  and  more  importantly,  introducing  private  credit  bureaus  capable  of 




Competition policy can also contribute to further SME lending.  The survey results suggest that 
there  are  private  banks  that  have  more  effective  lending  technologies  and  that  are  able  to 
generate and manage a significant SME portfolio, even within weak enabling environments.  The 
entry of these banks into other MENA countries could contribute to more SME lending, both 
directly and through spillover effects.  In this case, the policy implication is to ensure that entry 
requirements are not overly restrictive and that banking markets remain contestable. Moreover, 
the impact of the entry of foreign banks on SME lending can be magnified if there are credit 
registries/bureaus with good coverage and depth providing these new foreign banks access to 
substantive credit information on prospective SME borrowers.
14  
 
Governments play a critical role in promoting an  enabling environment in which private banks 
can fulfill their SME finance targets prudently and responsibly. In the interim, state banks would 
be well advised to place a higher emphasis on risk management, so that the greater risks they are 
currently taking in extending SME finance arise from well informed decisions and are better 
monitored.  Likewise, credit guarantee schemes  can play an important role and can even be 
expanded in some countries, but most schemes can be improved in design and  should  start 
conducting comprehensive reviews that include evaluations of impact.   
 
Lastly, it is important to recognize that t he potential for SME finance is  also a function of the 
structure of the economy and the size of the SME sector. In the case of non-GCC countries, there 
is  huge  potential  for  expanding  SME  finance,  with  large  numbers  of  smaller  enterprises 
underserved and low levels of bank competition to serve them.  In the case of GCC countries, the 
size of the SME sector may remain more constrained by the nature of oil economies, but there is 
also scope for further SME finance, especially if access to finance is also expanded for resident 
non-nationals.    
                                                           
14 Maddedu provides a review of credit reporting systems in MENA (2010). Azoategui, Martinez Peria, and Rocha 
(2010) provide an analysis of bank competition in MENA, showing that the region is generally less competitive than 
other regions, and also showing that bank competition indices are determined inter alia by entry regulations, and the 








Figure 1b  





Figure 1c  
% of Investment Finance by Bank Financing, MENA and other Regions 
 
 




SME Loans/Total Loans (%) and SME Lending Targets (%)*: GCC vs. Non-GCC 
 
* Weighted by total loans. 
 
Figure 2b 










SME Loans/Total Loans (%)*: MENA Countries 
 
*Reported numbers are weighted averages and Non-GCC average includes Iraqi banks that were not reported 
in the graph as the coverage Iraq is not more than 30%.   
 
Figure 3b 
Comparison of Enterprise Surveys and SME Banking Survey 
 







SME Loans/Total Loans (%): GCC vs. Non-GCC Bank 
 
 
Skewness: 1.39                  Skewness: 1.52     
Kurtosis: 3.94                  Kurtosis: 5.78 
Figure 4b 
SME Loans/Total Loans (%): State vs. Private Bank 
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% of Banks responding that Driver is Very Important or Important for SME Financing: 





% of Banks responding that Driver is Very Important or Important for SME Financing: 






% of Banks responding that Obstacle is Very Important or Important for SME Financing: 




% of Banks responding that Obstacle is Very Important or Important for SME Financing: 









































































% of Banks responding that SME lending is more or equally risky than other business 





% of Banks responding that SME lending is more or equally risky than other business 











% of Banks indicating the selection criteria used for targeting SMEs:  






Comparison of Exports, Oil and Non-Oil Economies in MENA 
 
 








































% of Banks informing SME clients about the factors driving Ratings/Scorings:  





% of Banks informing SME clients about the factors driving Ratings/Scorings: 


















% of Banks indicating that collateral requirements are higher for SMEs than for larger 





% of Banks indicating the reason as Very Important or Important for higher SME 








% of Banks indicating that collateral requirements are higher for SMEs than for larger 





% of Banks indicating the reason as Very Important or Important for higher SME 


















% of Banks indicating the impact of adoption of Basel II on SME Lending:  





% of Banks indicating the impact of adoption of Basel II on SME Lending: 





 Characteristics of banks in the sample 
 
Country  No. of Banks  Market Share Covered 
Bahrain  9  67% 
Egypt  11  60% 
Iraq  10  26% 
Jordan  13  91% 
Kuwait  7  60% 
Lebanon  9  46% 
Libya  5  28% 
Morocco  5  80% 
Oman  5  71% 
Palestine  7  95% 
Qatar  9  77% 
Saudi Arabia  11  98% 
Syria  12  90% 
Tunisia  4  35% 
United Arab Emirates  16  69% 
Yemen  6  33% 
GCC  57  74% 
Non-GCC  82  58% 
Total  139  64% 
   No. of Banks    
State  29    
Private   110    
Total  139    
       
Memo:      
Private   110    
    o/w Domestic  76    
    o/w Foreign Regional  25    
    o/w Foreign International  9    
      
State  29    
    GCC  11    










Thresholds for Small and Medium Enterprises, GCC banks, Non-GCC banks and the EU 
 
   Turnover -- Thousands of US Dollars  
           Minimum Small                   Maximum Small                Maximum Medium 
GCC  365  5,456  18,390 
Non-GCC  61  897  4,757 
Memo: EU  2,816  14,085  70,422 
   Turnover -- Multiples of Per Capita Income 
           Minimum Small                   Maximum Small                Maximum Medium 
GCC  8  144  601 
Non-GCC  26  342  1,719 
Memo: EU  85  427  2,134 
   Number of Employees 
           Minimum Small                   Maximum Small                Maximum Medium 
GCC  3  24  90 
Non-GCC  4  17  58 
Memo: EU  20  50  250 
(*) GCC and Non-GCC: Average of individual bank thresholds 




















Table 3  






No. of Banks  Actual SME 
Lending  No. of Banks 
Bahrain  5.88  3  1.14  6 
Egypt  24.72  7  5.22  9 
Jordan  25.276  12  10.40  13 
Kuwait  9.22  6  2.45  4 
Lebanon  30.64  8  16.14  8 
Morocco  29.4  3  23.79  5 
Oman  11.39  5  2.48  4 
Palestine  27.84  4  6.20  4 
Qatar  15.14  7  0.49  5 
Saudi Arabia  8.90  9  1.70  7 
Syria  13.90  9  4.12  10 
Tunisia  15.66  4  15.34  4 
United Arab Emirates  24.26  8  3.85  7 
Yemen  22.71  4  20.25  2 
           
GCC  12.47  38  2.02  33 
Non-GCC  26.71  61  13.16  65 
MENA  19.59  99  7.59  98 
(*) Non-GCC and MENA averages and totals include Iraq, but it is not reported in the table above as its coverage 
is less than 30%. Iraq is however included in the remaining analysis. Libyan banks are not included in the 
average and quantitative data analysis as their figures could not be verified during the follow-up process. Libya is 
however included in qualitative analysis. 
 
Table 4  
Average share of SME Loans in total Bank Loans 
 











World Bank/UAB (2010) 





SME Loans/Total Loans (%)  26.8  22.1  16.2  7.59  13.16 
1 Canada, France, Korea, Sweden, and the US.  





Table 5  
Test of Differences in means between regions and ownership of banks 
 
   Weighted Averages* 
   GCC  Non-GCC  t-test  p-value 
SME Loans/Total Loans (%)  2.02  13.16  4.77  0.00*** 
         
Investment Loans/SME Loans (%)  15.43  26.40  4.38  0.00*** 
          
   Un-weighted Averages 
   GCC  Non-GCC  t-test  p-value 
SME Loans/Total Loans (%)  2.08  15.82  6.89  0.00*** 
         
Investment Loans/SME Loans (%)  14.68  30.69  3.64  0.00*** 
          
   Private  State  t-test  p-value 
SME Loans/Total Loans (%)  11.34  8.99  0.82  0.42 
         
Investment Loans/SME Loans (%)  22.43  32.38  1.40  0.18 
          
  
Domestic 
(Private)  Foreign  t-test  p-value 
SME Loans/Total Loans (%)  11.67  10.56  0.29  0.77 
         
Investment Loans/SME Loans (%)  22.80  21.48  0.27  0.79 






























Middle East & North Africa  3.5  3.5  2.6  2.6 
GCC  3.8  4.2  6.4  2.9 
Non-GCC  3.2  3.7  0.0  2.5 
East Asia  5.3  8.9  14.6  3.7 
Eastern Europe  6.8  2.4  14.1  3.5 
Former Soviet Union  5.7  0.5  1.1  1.7 
High income: Non-OECD  6.5  0.0  46.3  4.5 
High income: OECD  6.8  8.1  58.1  4.9 
Latin America  4.4  10.6  36.2  4.6 
South Asia  5.7  0.5  2.0  2.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.2  1.0  6.9  1.5 





Outstanding Guarantees as a % of GDP 
 
Country  2007  2008  2009 
Egypt  0.08%  0.08%  0.09% 
Jordan  0.07%  0.07%  0.07% 
Lebanon  0.85%  0.84%  0.87% 
Morocco  0.33%  0.35%  0.41% 
Palestine  0.05%  0.16%  0.27% 
Saudi Arabia  0.01%  0.01%  0.02% 
Tunisia  0.34%  0.39%  0.50% 








Table 8.1: Determinants of Lending to SMEs (OLS) 
Dependent Variable: Share of SME Loans in Total Bank Loans 
Regressions are estimated via OLS at bank level for the year 2007 to 2009. Robust t statistics in brackets and (bank level) clustered t statistics in parenthesis.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Log Total loans  -1.47  -2.53  -2.53  -2.26  -1.33  -1.09  -2.44  -2.53  -2.14  -1.72  -1.52 
   [3.81]***  [4.60]***  [4.59]***  [4.08]***  [2.48]**  [2.28]**  [6.33]***  [6.51]***  [5.36]***  [4.22]***  [3.80]*** 
   (2.50)**  (3.15)***  (3.14)***  (2.78)***  (1.70)*  (1.52)  (4.18)***  (4.32)***  (3.49)***  (2.73)***  (2.57)** 
GCC Dummy  -9.36  -4.13  -6.14  -7.44  -11.71  -5.41  -5.19  -6.21  -8.14  -9.79  -5.36 
   [7.08]***  [2.13]**  [2.80]***  [3.46]***  [4.98]***  [3.11]***  [3.20]***  [3.61]***  [4.23]***  [4.75]***  [3.60]*** 
   (4.30)***  (1.34)  (1.74)*  (2.19)**  (3.15)***  (1.98)*  (2.03)**  (2.26)**  (2.67)***  (2.98)***  (2.30)** 
State Ownership Dummy  0.59  0.86  2.00  0.96  1.54  1.24  1.50  2.23  1.65  1.75  1.29 
   [0.40]  [0.52]  [1.18]  [0.60]  [0.96]  [0.73]  [0.97]  [1.39]  [1.10]  [1.12]  [0.84] 
   (0.25)  (0.31)  (0.71)  (0.36)  (0.57)  (0.44)  (0.58)  (0.83)  (0.66)  (0.66)  (0.50) 
Log Number of Branches    1.58  1.20  1.72  0.69  0.17            
     [1.95]*  [1.43]  [2.16]**  [0.94]  [0.24]            
     (1.27)  (0.92)  (1.42)  (0.62)  (0.15)            
Separate Unit for SME Clients Dummy              6.39  5.25  6.12  4.45  2.86 
               [3.12]***  [2.56]**  [3.05]***  [2.18]**  [1.24] 
               (1.96)*  (1.62)  (1.93)*  (1.38)  (0.75) 
Maximum Coverage Registry or Bureau    0.00  -0.01  0.08  0.03  -0.08  -0.01  -0.02  0.06  0.01  -0.03 
     [0.04]  [0.22]  [1.69]*  [0.61]  [1.63]  [0.21]  [0.32]  [1.12]  [0.21]  [0.56] 
     (0.03)  (0.17)  (1.37)  (0.43)  (1.28)  (0.16)  (0.25)  (0.94)  (0.15)  (0.43) 
Legal Rights Index      1.92          1.53        
       [2.27]**          [1.79]*        
       (1.36)          (1.09)        
Time to Register Property        -0.07          -0.06      
         [4.27]***          [3.78]***      
         (2.96)***          (2.58)**      
Time to Enforce a Contract          -0.03          -0.02    
           [5.91]***          [4.17]***    
           (3.77)***          (2.73)***    
Time to Close a Business            -2.48          -1.70 
             [3.67]***          [2.62]*** 
             (2.43)**          (1.74)* 
Partial Credit Guarantee % of GDP    10.16  10.31  8.51  7.19  11.91  12.37  12.47  10.98  10.12  13.58 
     [3.87]***  [3.95]***  [3.09]***  [2.66]***  [4.32]***  [4.75]***  [4.92]***  [4.02]***  [3.91]***  [5.06]*** 
     (2.49)**  (2.52)**  (1.98)*  (1.71)*  (2.74)***  (3.20)***  (3.32)***  (2.68)***  (2.63)**  (3.37)*** 
Observations  245  239  239  239  239  203  220  220  220  220  184 
R-squared  0.32  0.35  0.37  0.37  0.42  0.39  0.39  0.41  0.41  0.42  0.39 
Number of Countries  15  15  15  15  15  13  15  15  15  15  13 
Number of Banks  96  96  96  96  96  82  88  88  88  88  74 57 
 
 
Table 8.2: Determinants of Investment Lending to SMEs (OLS) 
Dependent Variable: Share of Investment Loans in Total SME Loans  
Regressions are estimated via OLS at bank level for the year 2007 to 2009. Robust t statistics in brackets and (bank level) clustered t statistics in parenthesis.* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Log Total loans  -1.49  -4.39  -4.49  -4.13  -3.89  -0.04  -2.70  -2.58  -2.45  -2.30  -0.71 
   [1.82]*  [3.42]***  [3.45]***  [3.25]***  [3.07]***  [0.02]  [2.90]***  [2.67]***  [2.60]***  [2.40]**  [0.66] 
   (1.10)  (2.05)**  (2.06)**  (1.97)*  (1.86)*  (0.01)  (1.78)*  (1.64)  (1.63)  (1.50)  (0.40) 
GCC Dummy  -13.96  -6.58  -3.75  -9.01  -10.04  -14.20  -12.94  -11.58  -15.32  -15.60  -13.60 
   [4.50]***  [1.30]  [0.70]  [1.66]*  [1.64]  [2.63]***  [3.11]***  [2.84]***  [3.23]***  [2.94]***  [3.28]*** 
   (2.66)***  (0.79)  (0.42)  (1.07)  (0.99)  (1.62)  (1.91)*  (1.75)*  (2.11)**  (1.78)*  (2.04)** 
State Ownership Dummy  10.12  12.03  10.67  11.85  11.99  15.31  14.47  13.74  14.26  14.23  15.23 
   [2.36]**  [2.83]***  [2.57]**  [2.81]***  [2.77]***  [3.39]***  [3.22]***  [3.07]***  [3.21]***  [3.14]***  [3.31]*** 
   (1.38)  (1.66)*  (1.51)  (1.65)  (1.62)  (2.00)**  (1.88)*  (1.79)*  (1.88)*  (1.83)*  (1.93)* 
Log Number of Branches    4.85  5.598  4.793  4.562  -0.514            
     [2.68]***  [2.96]***  [2.66]***  [2.59]**  [0.29]            
     (1.59)  (1.74)*  (1.58)  (1.54)  (0.18)            
Separate Unit for SME Clients Dummy              6.76  8.11  6.63  5.86  3.19 
               [1.56]  [1.74]*  [1.54]  [1.31]  [0.67] 
               (0.93)  (1.03)  (0.92)  (0.78)  (0.40) 
Maximum Coverage Registry or Bureau    0.30  0.32  0.35  0.31  0.30  0.35  0.37  0.40  0.36  0.32 
     [1.75]*  [1.91]*  [1.92]*  [1.82]*  [1.84]*  [2.18]**  [2.38]**  [2.34]**  [2.21]**  [2.00]** 
     (1.20)  (1.32)  (1.36)  (1.25)  (1.32)  (1.48)  (1.60)  (1.64)  (1.50)  (1.44) 
Legal Rights Index      -2.22          -1.85        
       [1.59]          [1.24]        
       (0.95)          (0.74)        
Time to Register Property        -0.04          -0.05      
         [1.11]          [1.13]      
         (0.82)          (0.83)      
Time to Enforce a Contract          -0.01          -0.01    
           [0.98]          [0.85]    
           (0.58)          (0.50)    
Time to Close a Business            -1.89          -1.70 
             [1.20]          [1.10] 
             (0.72)          (0.66) 
Partial Credit Guarantee % of GDP    18.12  18.64  16.79  16.37  20.37  16.82  17.01  15.49  15.39  19.64 
     [2.46]**  [2.55]**  [2.26]**  [2.15]**  [2.89]***  [2.17]**  [2.20]**  [1.99]**  [1.96]*  [2.64]*** 
     (1.46)  (1.51)  (1.35)  (1.27)  (1.70)*  (1.29)  (1.30)  (1.19)  (1.17)  (1.55) 
Observations  238  230  230  230  230  202  227  227  227  227  199 
R-squared  0.18  0.25  0.26  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.24 
Number of Countries  15  15  15  15  15  13  15  15  15  15  13 





Table 8.3: Determinants of Lending to SMEs (2SLS) 
Dependent Variable: Share of SME Loans in Total Bank Loans 
Regressions are estimated via 2SLS at bank level for the year 2007 to 2009. Robust t statistics in brackets and (bank level) clustered t statistics in parenthesis.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Log Total loans  -1.92  -2.70  -2.69  -2.27  -1.61  -1.05  -2.47  -2.56  -2.04  -1.86  -1.33 
   [4.19]***  [4.35]***  [4.34]***  [3.62]***  [2.69]***  [2.01]**  [5.55]***  [5.70]***  [4.39]***  [3.92]***  [3.03]*** 
   (3.25)***  (3.54)***  (3.55)***  (2.91)***  (2.20)**  (1.50)  (4.41)***  (4.54)***  (3.43)***  (3.06)***  (2.32)** 
GCC Dummy  -5.64  -2.93  -5.04  -8.79  -10.08  -5.74  -4.67  -5.69  -9.79  -8.67  -5.80 
   [3.01]***  [1.29]  [2.01]**  [3.09]***  [3.71]***  [2.92]***  [2.35]**  [2.76]***  [3.83]***  [3.46]***  [3.22]*** 
   (2.21)**  (0.97)  (1.49)  (2.34)**  (2.75)***  (2.15)**  (1.75)*  (2.05)**  (2.91)***  (2.55)**  (2.39)** 
State Ownership Dummy  1.11  0.09  1.27  0.12  0.91  0.74  1.24  1.94  1.16  1.46  0.99 
   [0.62]  [0.05]  [0.64]  [0.06]  [0.49]  [0.37]  [0.71]  [1.05]  [0.69]  [0.82]  [0.56] 
   (0.45)  (0.03)  (0.46)  (0.05)  (0.35)  (0.26)  (0.51)  (0.75)  (0.50)  (0.59)  (0.40) 
Log Number of Branches    1.91  1.52  1.98  1.03  0.46           
     [2.18]**  [1.70]*  [2.32]**  [1.33]  [0.66]           
     (1.70)*  (1.31)  (1.83)*  (1.05)  (0.48)           
Separate Unit for SME Clients Dummy              6.86  5.65  6.10  5.06  3.13 
               [2.96]***  [2.47]**  [2.68]***  [2.20]**  [1.19] 
               (2.23)**  (1.85)*  (2.03)**  (1.65)  (0.86) 
Maximum Coverage Registry or Bureau    -0.03  -0.04  0.15  0.01  -0.04  -0.04  -0.05  0.13  -0.02  -0.01 
     [0.44]  [0.71]  [2.53]**  [0.11]  [0.83]  [0.71]  [0.88]  [2.03]**  [0.34]  [0.14] 
     (0.37)  (0.60)  (2.41)**  (0.08)  (0.70)  (0.59)  (0.73)  (1.97)*  (0.27)  (0.12) 
Legal Rights Index      1.94          1.55       
       [1.97]*          [1.56]       
       (1.43)          (1.14)       
Time to Register Property        -0.14          -0.12     
         [3.54]***          [3.28]***     
         (2.69)***          (2.48)**     
Time to Enforce a Contract          -0.03          -0.02   
           [4.60]***          [3.04]***   
           (3.45)***          (2.34)**   
Time to Close a Business            -1.64          -1.00 
             [2.66]***          [1.64] 
             (1.95)*          (1.20) 
Partial Credit Guarantee % of GDP  10.29  10.03  9.71  7.93  7.53  11.65  11.89  11.66  9.97  10.15  13.09 
   [3.27]***  [3.15]***  [3.08]***  [2.35]**  [2.28]**  [3.39]***  [3.60]***  [3.64]***  [2.90]***  [3.09]***  [3.81]*** 
   (2.41)**  (2.31)**  (2.26)**  (1.73)*  (1.67)*  (2.46)**  (2.66)***  (2.69)***  (2.15)**  (2.28)**  (2.78)*** 
Observations  177  177  177  177  177  151  162  162  162  162  136 
Number of Countries  15  15  15  15  15  13  15  15  15  15  13 
Number of Banks  96  96  96  96  96  82  88  88  88  88  74 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic  5779  6924  8522  7827  7878  13195  6186  7759  6870  6524  11728 
Hansen J statistic  1.31  0.07  2.3  0.04  0.12  3.31  0.14  0.72  0  0.01  2.61 




Table 8.4: Determinants of Lending to SMEs (2SLS) 
Dependent Variable: Share of SME Investment Loans in Total SME Loans 
Regressions are estimated via 2SLS at bank level for the year 2007 to 2009. Robust t statistics in brackets and (bank level) clustered t statistics in parenthesis.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Log Total loans  -2.00  -4.20  -4.37  -3.95  -3.74  -0.23  -2.45  -2.37  -2.16  -2.07  -0.82 
   [2.01]**  [2.68]***  [2.76]***  [2.50]**  [2.40]**  [0.11]  [2.21]**  [2.06]**  [1.92]*  [1.83]*  [0.64] 
   (1.47)  (1.94)*  (1.99)**  (1.82)*  (1.74)*  (0.08)  (1.63)  (1.52)  (1.42)  (1.36)  (0.46) 
GCC Dummy  -7.34  -5.03  -2.11  -7.46  -8.16  -12.88  -12.04  -10.81  -15.63  -14.66  -12.77 
   [1.77]*  [0.81]  [0.32]  [1.00]  [1.08]  [1.92]*  [2.41]**  [2.22]**  [2.48]**  [2.32]**  [2.57]** 
   (1.26)  (0.58)  (0.23)  (0.72)  (0.77)  (1.36)  (1.72)*  (1.58)  (1.78)*  (1.65)  (1.84)* 
State Ownership Dummy  12.12  10.91  9.64  10.71  10.86  13.97  13.39  12.82  12.93  13.11  14.15 
   [2.26]**  [2.14]**  [1.93]*  [2.13]**  [2.09]**  [2.55]**  [2.47]**  [2.36]**  [2.44]**  [2.39]**  [2.52]** 
   (1.61)  (1.53)  (1.38)  (1.52)  (1.49)  (1.81)*  (1.76)*  (1.68)*  (1.74)*  (1.69)*  (1.79)* 
Log Number of Branches    4.85  5.65  4.67  4.53  -0.29           
     [2.21]**  [2.46]**  [2.17]**  [2.12]**  [0.13]           
     (1.58)  (1.75)*  (1.55)  (1.51)  (0.09)           
Separate Unit for SME Clients Dummy              6.66  7.87  6.53  5.76  4.01 
               [1.29]  [1.40]  [1.27]  [1.08]  [0.71] 
               (0.93)  (1.01)  (0.91)  (0.78)  (0.50) 
Maximum Coverage Registry or Bureau    0.23  0.26  0.30  0.24  0.27  0.30  0.33  0.41  0.31  0.29 
     [1.23]  [1.40]  [1.28]  [1.30]  [1.53]  [1.74]*  [1.88]*  [1.87]*  [1.77]*  [1.73]* 
     (0.89)  (1.01)  (0.93)  (0.94)  (1.11)  (1.25)  (1.36)  (1.35)  (1.28)  (1.25) 
Legal Rights Index      -2.18          -1.66       
       [1.32]          [0.93]       
       (0.94)          (0.66)       
Time to Register Property        -0.06          -0.09     
         [0.60]          [0.97]     
         (0.43)          (0.70)     
Time to Enforce a Contract          -0.01          -0.01   
           [0.71]          [0.70]   
           (0.51)          (0.50)   
Time to Close a Business            -2.01          -1.82 
             [1.12]          [1.02] 
             (0.79)          (0.72) 
Partial Credit Guarantee % of GDP  19.46  17.24  18.17  16.31  15.85  19.68  15.80  16.42  14.33  14.53  18.74 
   [2.27]**  [1.97]*  [2.09]**  [1.84]*  [1.74]*  [2.34]**  [1.69]*  [1.76]*  [1.53]  [1.53]  [2.08]** 
   (1.61)  (1.39)  (1.48)  (1.30)  (1.23)  (1.65)  (1.19)  (1.24)  (1.08)  (1.08)  (1.47) 
Observations  164  164  164  164  164  145  162  162  162  162  143 
Number of Countries  15  15  15  15  15  13  15  15  15  15  13 
Number of Banks  87  87  87  87  87  77  86  86  86  86  76 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic  5970  7520  9116  8327  7617  13006  7565  9062  8184  7473  13011 
Hansen J statistic  0.16  0.29  0  0.4  0.46  2.88  0.01  0.35  0.01  0  3.13 
P value of Hansen J statistic  0.69  0.59  0.98  0.53  0.5  0.09  0.93  0.55  0.93  0.95  0.08 57 
 
 




Observations  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
SME Loans/Total Loans (%)  271  10.1  12.3  0.0  55.0 
Investment Loans/SME Loans (%)  270  24.1  22.8  0.0  80.0 
Log Total loans  339  20.8  2.4  13.8  24.7 
Log Number of Branches  396  3.3  1.4  0.0  6.7 
Maximum Coverage Registry or Bureau  381  8.0  9.8  0.0  36.0 
Legal Rights Index  399  3.1  1.2  0.0  4.0 
Time to Register Property  399  29.4  34.1  2.0  193.0 
Time to Enforce a Contract  399  662.8  142.8  520.0  1010.0 
Recovery rate for Closing a Business  348  31.0  15.1  10.0  63.0 
Time to Close a Business  348  3.6  0.9  1.0  5.0 
Partial Credit Guarantee % of GDP  399  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.9 
Lag of Partial Credit Guarantee % of GDP  266  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.9 





































































% of GDP 
Investment Loans/SME 
Loans (%) 
0.26***  1                             
Log Total loans   -0.47***   -0.29***  1                          
GCC Dummy   -0.50***   -0.35***  0.53***  1                        
State Ownership Dummy  -0.01  0.17***  0.07  0.02  1                      
Maximum Coverage 
Registry or Bureau 
 -0.30***  -0.1  0.40***  0.59***  -0.02  1                    
Log Number of Branches  0.02  0.09  0.55*  -0.07  0.12**  0.02  1                  
Separate Unit for SME 
Clients Dummy 
-0.04  -0.07  0.31***  0.27***   -0.17***  0.13**  0.22***  1                
Legal Rights Index   -0.13**   -0.23***  0.43***  0.58***   -0.14***  0.42***  0.18***  0.49***  1              
Time to Register Property  -0.07  0.05  0.04   -0.32***  0.04  0.01  0.16***   -0.10*   -0.21***  1            
Time to Enforce a Contract   -0.12*  0.06  0.06   -0.47***  0.04   -0.19***  0.19***   -0.22***   -0.34***  0.60***  1          
Recovery rate for Closing a 
Business 
-0.10  0.01  0.10  0.28***   -0.09*  0.46***   -0.22***  0.06  0.02  -0.08   -0.23***  1        
Time to Close a Business   -0.22***  -0.01   -0.18***  0.04  0.08   -0.23***   -0.18***  -0.09  0.07  -0.01  0.15***   -0.69***  1      
Outstanding Credit 
Guarantee % of GDP 
0.30***  0.27***  -0.01   -0.40***   -0.15***  -0.04  0.22***  0.03   -0.10**  0.11**  0.13***    -0.18***   -0.10*      
Lag Outstanding Credit 
Guarantee % of GDP 
0.29***   0.26***  -0.02    -0.4***   -0.15**  -0.07  0.22***  0.04  -0.08  0.17***  0.14**    -0.19***  -0.06   0.99***  1 
Median Coverage Ratio of 
PCG Scheme 
0.43***  0.29***    -0.42***   -0.3***    -0.26***   -0.31***    -0.25***  0.14***  0.23***   -0.44***   -0.39***   -0.21***  0.32***   0.60***  0.63*** 







Appendix Table 3: Definition and Sources of variables used in Regression Analysis 
  
Variable   Definition   Source 
SME Loans  Total SME loans for a bank expressed as a percentage of total loans  UAB and World Bank SME Survey 
Investment Loans  Total SME loans for investment purposes expressed as percentage of total SME loans  UAB and World Bank SME Survey 
Log Total Loans  Logarithm of total loans for a bank   UAB and World Bank SME Survey 
and Bankscope Database 
GCC Dummy  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if a bank is in GCC region and  0 otherwise  World Bank 
State Ownership Dummy  Dummy that takes value 1 if a bank is owned by government and 0 otherwise  UAB and World Bank SME Survey 
Log Number of Branches  Logarithm of total number of branches for a bank   UAB and World Bank SME Survey 
and Bankscope Database 
Separate Unit for SME Clients  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if a bank has a separate unit for SMEs and 0 otherwise  UAB and World Bank SME Survey 
Maximum Coverage Registry 
or Bureau 
Highest coverage ratio of either the public registry or the private bureau and includes the 
number of individuals and firms listed with information on their borrowing history from past 
five years 
World Bank‟s Doing Business  
Legal Rights Index  The degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders 
and thus facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating better 
protection 
World Bank‟s Doing Business 
Time to Register Property  Number of days that property lawyers, notaries or registry officials indicate is necessary to 
complete a procedure. 
World Bank‟s Doing Business 
Time to Enforce a Contract  Number of days counted from the moment the plaintiff decides to file the lawsuit in court until 
payment. This includes both the days when actions take place and the waiting periods between 
World Bank‟s Doing Business 
Recovery rate for Closing a 
Business 
Recorded as cents on the dollar recouped by creditors through reorganization, liquidation or 
debt enforcement (foreclosure) proceedings 
World Bank‟s Doing Business 
Time to Close a Business  Number of years for creditors to recover their credit. The period of time measured is from the 
company‟s default until the payment of some or all of the money owed to the bank. 
World Bank‟s Doing Business 
Partial Credit Guarantee   Outstanding credit guarantees expressed as a percentage of GDP  Saadani, Arvai, and Rocha (2010) 
Median Coverage of PCG 
Scheme 
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